Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.013zbMath1422.91125OpenAlexW2590014728WikidataQ98704589 ScholiaQ98704589MaRDI QIDQ1753692

Martin Dufwenberg, Martin A. Dufwenberg

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6208.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

costspsychological game theorylyingcheatingaudienceperceived cheating aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (9)

Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Promises and endogenous reneging costs ⋮ The influence of self and social image concerns on lying ⋮ Lying with heterogeneous image concerns ⋮ Lying for votes ⋮ It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: conditional norm-following and belief distortion ⋮ Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation ⋮ Team production and esteem: a dual selves model with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types

Cites Work

• Incentives and cheating
• Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
• Dynamic psychological games
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
• Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Sequential Equilibria
• Bad Boys: How Criminal Identity Salience Affects Rule Violation

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