Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.016zbMath1422.91390OpenAlexW2790777478MaRDI QIDQ1753695

Ruqu Wang, Bin Liu, Jun Zhang, Jingfeng Lu

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.016

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationmechanism designleverageoptimal contestcross transfernegative prize

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (8)

Optimal contest design: tuning the heat ⋮ Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles ⋮ Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ Ability grouping in contests ⋮ Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ Inefficiency of sponsored research

Cites Work

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• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Continuity in auction design
• Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
• Contest architecture
• Surplus Extraction and Competition
• Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design

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