Price instability in multi-unit auctions
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Publication:1753696
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.008zbMath1422.91288OpenAlexW3122079662MaRDI QIDQ1753696
Pär Holmberg, Edward J. Anderson
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/79151
multi-unit auctionswholesale electricity marketsconvergence of Nash equilibriaindivisible unitprice instabilitysupply function equilibria
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)
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