Dynamic relational contracts under complete information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.004zbMath1422.91441OpenAlexW1527980237MaRDI QIDQ1753710

Jonathan P. Thomas, Tim Worrall

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/54672280/ThomasWorrallJET2018DynamicRelationalContracts.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

risk sharingrelational contractslimited commitmentself-enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (2)

Monotone contracts ⋮ A theory of progressive lending

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Power fluctuations and political economy
• Stochastic stability of monotone economies in regenerative environments
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams

This page was built for publication: Dynamic relational contracts under complete information