Espionage and the optimal standard of the customs-trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT) program in maritime security
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Publication:1754018
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2017.03.014zbMath1403.91078OpenAlexW2596129769MaRDI QIDQ1754018
Aniruddha Bagchi, Jomon Aliyas Paul
Publication date: 30 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.03.014
Related Items (3)
Role of Intelligence Inputs in Defending Against Cyber Warfare and Cyberterrorism ⋮ National security vs. human rights: a game theoretic analysis of the tension between these objectives ⋮ Decision support model for cybersecurity risk planning: a two-stage stochastic programming framework featuring firms, government, and attacker
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