Multi-objective Stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with incomplete information
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Publication:1754164
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.034zbMath1403.90127OpenAlexW2765767827MaRDI QIDQ1754164
Publication date: 30 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.034
Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)
Related Items (7)
New algorithm for checking Pareto optimality in bimatrix games ⋮ A linear-quadratic mean-field stochastic Stackelberg differential game with random exit time ⋮ Producing two substitutable products under a supply chain including two manufacturers and one retailer: a game-theoretic approach ⋮ Stackelberg production-protection games: defending crop production against intentional attacks ⋮ A bi-level model and memetic algorithm for arc interdiction location-routing problem ⋮ A study of general and security Stackelberg game formulations ⋮ Analyzing the Chinese Telecommunication Industry Based on Oligopoly Game and Dynamic Evolution
Uses Software
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