The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.054zbMath1403.91135OpenAlexW2766850920MaRDI QIDQ1754180

Xianqiang Yang

Publication date: 30 May 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.054

zbMATH Keywords

auctions/biddingsocial choice functionimplementabilityaffine maximizer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics
• Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good
• Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information
• Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
• Functional equations in applied sciences
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation
• Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism

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