On the impact of information disclosure on advance reservations: a game-theoretic view
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Publication:1754285
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.023zbMath1403.90252OpenAlexW2780767887MaRDI QIDQ1754285
Eran Simhon, David Starobinski
Publication date: 30 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.12.023
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