Cooperation royalty contract design in research and development alliances: help vs. knowledge-sharing

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2018.01.053zbMath1403.91226OpenAlexW2791185168MaRDI QIDQ1754377

Xinning Yu, Yanfei Lan, Ruiqing Zhao

Publication date: 30 May 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.01.053

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardresearch and developmentcontract designhelpknowledge-sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (6)

Inter-organizational purchasing contracts: the effects of multi-agents in a supplying firm ⋮ Robust optimal R&D investment under technical uncertainty in a regime-switching environment ⋮ A dynamic model of knowledge management in innovative technology companies: a case from the energy sector ⋮ A comparison of milestone contract and royalty contract under critical value criterion in R\&D alliance ⋮ Optimal product release time for a new high-tech startup firm under technical uncertainty ⋮ Manufacturer's R\&D cooperation contract: linear fee or revenue-sharing payment in a low-carbon supply chain

Cites Work

• Dual sourcing under disruption risk and cost improvement through learning
• The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
• Knowledge sharing in communities of practice: a game theoretic analysis
• Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R\&D licensing contracts
• Learning curves for imperfect production processes with reworks and process restoration interruptions
• Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning
• Introduction of New Technologies to Competing Industrial Customers
• Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

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