Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1755244
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2018.08.049zbMath1431.91427OpenAlexW3122289542MaRDI QIDQ1755244
Peter M. Kort, Kuno J. M. Huisman, Herbert Dawid, Nick F. D. Huberts
Publication date: 9 January 2019
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/139139/1/EJOR_Revision_final_small_2.pdf
Related Items (7)
Investment timing and capacity choice in duopolistic competition under a jump-diffusion model ⋮ Demand uncertainty, product differentiation, and entry timing under spatial competition ⋮ Investment flexibility as a barrier to entry ⋮ Investment strategies of duopoly firms with asymmetric time-to-build under a jump-diffusion model ⋮ Dynamic investment strategies and leadership in product innovation ⋮ Capacity choice in (strategic) real options models: a survey ⋮ Leaving well-worn paths: reversal of the investment-uncertainty relationship and flexible biogas plant operation
Cites Work
- Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models
- Verification theorems for stochastic optimal control problems via a time dependent Fukushima--Dirichlet decomposition
- Investments in flexible production capacity
- Uncertainty and entry deterrence
- Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
- Capacity Investment Timing by Start-ups and Established Firms in New Markets
- Lumpy Capacity Investment and Disinvestment Dynamics
- Strategic Technology Choice and Capacity Investment Under Demand Uncertainty
- Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
- Capacity and Entry Under Demand Uncertainty
- Resource Flexibility with Responsive Pricing
This page was built for publication: Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework
