Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.005zbMath1419.91528OpenAlexW2275931385WikidataQ129558063 ScholiaQ129558063MaRDI QIDQ1756324

Maciej H. Kotowski, Sangram Vilasrao Kadam

Publication date: 14 January 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=9763&type=WPN

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingtwo-sided matchingdynamic matchingmarket-design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers, Stability in repeated matching markets, Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty, Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets, Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching, An advanced parking navigation system for downtown parking, Gradual college admission

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• The core of a monetary economy without trust
• Utility representation of an incomplete preference relation
• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
• Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
• Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
• The strong sequential core for two-period economies
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Stability in dynamic matching markets
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• A dynamic school choice model
• The weak sequential core for two-period economies
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
• Directed Matching and Monetary Exchange
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings