Strategy-proof location of public facilities
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Publication:1756325
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.010zbMath1419.91267OpenAlexW3122169464WikidataQ129467708 ScholiaQ129467708MaRDI QIDQ1756325
Marc Vorsatz, Jorge Alcalde-Unzu
Publication date: 14 January 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2454/33493
single-dipped preferencesPareto efficiencystrategy-proofnesssingle-peaked preferencessocial choice rule
Related Items (4)
Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ Upper set rules with binary ranges ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
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