The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.004zbMath1419.91173OpenAlexW2885727909MaRDI QIDQ1756328

Timo Heinrich, Jeannette E. Brosig-Koch

Publication date: 14 January 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

promisescommunicationmoral hazardreputationsocial distanceprocurement auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE
• KALPHA

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: experimental evidence
• Social distance in a virtual world experiment
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: an experimental study
• Altruism and social integration
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Moral hazard and adverse selection in procurement contracting
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game
• Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
• Implicit Cost Allocation and Bidding for Contracts
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
• FAVOURING FRIENDS
• Promises and Partnership
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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