Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
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Publication:1756332
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006zbMath1419.91098OpenAlexW3125222514WikidataQ129494927 ScholiaQ129494927MaRDI QIDQ1756332
Publication date: 14 January 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00157671
maximinequilibrium selectionevolutionary game theorybehavioral game theoryrisk-dominanceloss-aversionhalf-dominanceloss-dominanceprospect dynamic
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