King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
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Publication:1756333
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.07.007zbMath1419.91183OpenAlexW2564623871MaRDI QIDQ1756333
Publication date: 14 January 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6169.pdf
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Cites Work
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