Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003zbMath1419.91125OpenAlexW2890630730WikidataQ129205906 ScholiaQ129205906MaRDI QIDQ1756339

Giacomo Bonanno, Elias Tsakas

Publication date: 14 January 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8hn8r6cp

zbMATH Keywords

dominancerationalitycommon beliefordinal payoffsiterated deletion procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (6)

Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Dominance rationality: a unified approach ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

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