Ex-post price stability with convex costs

DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0599-1zbMath1418.91037OpenAlexW2767179675MaRDI QIDQ1757078

Martin C. Byford

Publication date: 28 December 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0599-1

zbMATH Keywords

core convergenceCournot competitionconvex costsBertrand competitionnon-transferable utility coalitional gamesdouble-marginalisation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets
• A theoretical foundation for the undercut-proof equilibrium
• Second best taxation as a game
• Bertrand without fudge
• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry
• Biform Games
• Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets
• Spatial Competition and the Core
• On the core and competitive equilibria of a market with indivisible goods
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

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