Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
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Publication:1757082
DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0603-9zbMath1418.91394OpenAlexW2774194253MaRDI QIDQ1757082
Vinay Ramani, K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao
Publication date: 28 December 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0603-9
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Cites Work
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