Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0616-zzbMath1418.91107WikidataQ130180396 ScholiaQ130180396MaRDI QIDQ1757090

Lionel Richefort

Publication date: 28 December 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/259480

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcomparative staticsmultiple public goodsbipartite contribution structurewarm-glow effects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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