Equal treatment without large numbers

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0617-yzbMath1418.91036OpenAlexW2791961305WikidataQ114231228 ScholiaQ114231228MaRDI QIDQ1757091

Juan Camilo Gómez, Camelia Bejan

Publication date: 28 December 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0617-y

zbMATH Keywords

corecore extensionsequal treatment propertyreplica games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• The relative interior of the base polyhedron and the core

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