Divide the dollar and conquer more: sequential bargaining and risk aversion

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0618-xzbMath1418.91040OpenAlexW2531239556MaRDI QIDQ1757092

Oriol Tejada, Philip D. Grech

Publication date: 28 December 2018

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0618-x

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrisk aversionNash bargaining solutionsequential procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• Nash bargaining and risk aversion

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