School choice with vouchers

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.013zbMath1419.91519OpenAlexW2899462600MaRDI QIDQ1757536

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 15 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.013

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencymatchingstrategy-proofnessschool choicevoucher

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Sticky matching in school choice
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Kidney Exchange
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage