An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.009zbMath1419.91317OpenAlexW2897172348WikidataQ129079809 ScholiaQ129079809MaRDI QIDQ1757537

Gary Charness, David Schmeidler, Dan Levin

Publication date: 15 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.009

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcomplexitysimilaritywinner's curse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• The winner's curse: conditional reasoning and belief formation
• Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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