Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
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Publication:1757549
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.003zbMath1419.91232OpenAlexW2901181722WikidataQ128818252 ScholiaQ128818252MaRDI QIDQ1757549
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.003
Related Items (3)
Consumer strategy, vendor strategy and equilibrium in duopoly markets with production costs ⋮ Policy experimentation with repeated elections ⋮ Dynamic survival bias in optimal stopping problems
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