Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
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Publication:1757561
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.03.008zbMath1419.91538OpenAlexW2790511851MaRDI QIDQ1757561
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10453/127681
Related Items (5)
Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain ⋮ Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions ⋮ Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case ⋮ Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
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- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
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- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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