Vote-motivated candidates

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.010zbMath1419.91264OpenAlexW2796216209MaRDI QIDQ1757570

Constantine S. Sorokin, Alexei V. Zakharov

Publication date: 15 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

payoff equivalencevotingrisk preferencesprobabilistic votingelectoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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• The Political Economy of Clientelism*
• Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
• Local Political Equilibria
• The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium

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