A simple model of competition between teams
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Publication:1757578
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006zbMath1419.91324OpenAlexW2803983343MaRDI QIDQ1757578
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (5)
Group size and group success in conflicts ⋮ Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles ⋮ Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests ⋮ An analysis of group contests with the possibility of a draw ⋮ Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
Cites Work
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
- Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
- Group contest success functions
- The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
- Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
- Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
- Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts
- The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
- Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
- Asymmetric contests with general technologies
- All-Pay Contests
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