Implementation via rights structures
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Publication:1757583
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.009zbMath1419.91272OpenAlexW2802826459WikidataQ129922523 ScholiaQ129922523MaRDI QIDQ1757583
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/49904
Related Items (14)
Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Computational implementation ⋮ Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium ⋮ Implementation in strong core by codes of rights ⋮ Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures ⋮ Motives and implementation with rights structures ⋮ Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? ⋮ Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation ⋮ Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray ⋮ Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
Cites Work
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