Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
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Publication:1757591
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.007zbMath1419.91400OpenAlexW3121666339WikidataQ129857247 ScholiaQ129857247MaRDI QIDQ1757591
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58104/
Decision theory (91B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (5)
Robust contracting in general contract spaces ⋮ Public goods with ambiguity in large economies ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Maxmin implementation ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
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