Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
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Publication:1757595
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.004zbMath1419.91531OpenAlexW1766224868WikidataQ129795565 ScholiaQ129795565MaRDI QIDQ1757595
Akihisa Tamura, Fuhito Kojima, Makoto Yokoo
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56189/1/MPRA_paper_56189.pdf
market designdeferred acceptancematching with constraintsmatching with contractstwo-sided matchingdiscrete convex analysis
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