Which inspection approach is better to prevent drug fraud: announced or unannounced?
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Publication:1757713
DOI10.1007/S11424-018-7163-3zbMath1419.91414OpenAlexW2904717505MaRDI QIDQ1757713
Jose Maria Sallan, Manman Zhang, Guowei Hua, Cheng, T. C. Edwin, Ju-liang Zhang
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-018-7163-3
Noncooperative games (91A10) Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)
Cites Work
- Optimal payment scheme when the supplier's quality level and cost are unknown
- Environmental policy à la carte: letting firms choose their regulation
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- Performance Measurement and Design in Supply Chains
- Producer-Supplier Contracts with Incomplete Information
- Quality Implications of Warranties in a Supply Chain
- Quality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts
- Time to Come Clean? Disclosure and Inspection Policies for Green Production
- Minimax Policies for Unobservable Inspections
- Inducing Environmental Disclosures: A Dynamic Mechanism Design Approach
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