A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
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Publication:1757808
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.08.008zbMath1250.91017OpenAlexW2000189373MaRDI QIDQ1757808
Publication date: 6 November 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.008
Related Items (3)
Cooperation in partly observable networked markets ⋮ Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks ⋮ Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
Cites Work
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