The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.002zbMath1251.91036OpenAlexW1996004303MaRDI QIDQ1758184

Juan J. Vidal-Puga

Publication date: 8 November 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1147

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsbargainingweighted Shapley valueHarsanyi paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure ⋮ Harsanyi support levels solutions ⋮ Solidarity in games with a coalition structure ⋮ On new characterizations of the Owen value ⋮ Bargaining and membership ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ Values and coalition configurations ⋮ Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values ⋮ The Owen and Banzhaf–Owen values revisited ⋮ A note on the group bargaining solution ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

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