There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.001zbMath1260.91074OpenAlexW1972436060MaRDI QIDQ1758194

Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell, Jack E. Graver

Publication date: 8 November 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10)

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Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions

Uses Software

• OEIS

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
• Characterization of monotonicity and neutrality for binary Paretian social decision rules
• The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
• A computation of the eighth Dedekind number
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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