Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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Publication:1758197
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.05.005zbMath1283.91019OpenAlexW2270306304MaRDI QIDQ1758197
Publication date: 8 November 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/36
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
- Folk theorem with communication
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
- Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
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- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
- Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
- Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
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