Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents

DOI10.3103/S0278641910030076zbMath1260.91043MaRDI QIDQ1759094

A. V. Tarazevich

Publication date: 20 November 2012

Published in: Moscow University Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

agentcontract theoryprincipalmodel of unfavorable selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Cites Work

• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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