The core and nucleolus in a model of information transferal

DOI10.1155/2012/379848zbMath1251.91042DBLPjournals/jam/HouD12OpenAlexW2154895860WikidataQ58906777 ScholiaQ58906777MaRDI QIDQ1760665

Dongshuang Hou, Theo S. H. Driessen

Publication date: 15 November 2012

Published in: Journal of Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2012/379848

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamestechnologynucleolusinformation market game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Symmetrical Core and Shapley Value of an Information Transferal Game

Cites Work

• A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games
• SHAPLEY VALUE IN A MODEL OF INFORMATION TRANSFERAL
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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