On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2012.04.009zbMath1251.91029OpenAlexW2140055348MaRDI QIDQ1761297

Noam Hazon, Yonatan Aumann, Michael Wooldridge, Sarit Kraus

Publication date: 15 November 2012

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2012.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulescomputational social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

Weighted partial order oriented three-way decisions under score-based common voting rules ⋮ On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information ⋮ New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates ⋮ Predicting winner and estimating margin of victory in elections using sampling ⋮ Reaching a joint decision with minimal elicitation of voter preferences ⋮ On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty ⋮ Computer science and decision theory ⋮ Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice ⋮ Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity ⋮ Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions ⋮ Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences

Cites Work

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• Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control

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