Values for Markovian coalition processes
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Publication:1762417
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0617-7zbMath1261.91004OpenAlexW1967587991MaRDI QIDQ1762417
Michel Grabisch, Ulrich Faigle
Publication date: 26 November 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0617-7
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