Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0621-YzbMath1261.91025OpenAlexW2091349741MaRDI QIDQ1762418

Hildegard Dierker, Egbert Dierker

Publication date: 26 November 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0621-y

zbMATH Keywords

constrained efficiencyDrèze equilibriaincomplete markets with productionminimal efficiencymarket structure and pricingfirm objectives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Constrained efficiency versus unanimity in incomplete markets ⋮ Production externalities: internalization by voting ⋮ Financial intermediation and the welfare theorems in incomplete markets ⋮ A bargaining theory of the firm

Cites Work

• Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies
• Welfare and efficiency in incomplete market economies with a single firm
• A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
• Incomplete markets over an infinite horizon: Long-lived securities and speculative bubbles
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
• Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete
• Drèze equilibria and welfare maxima

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