On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems

DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0618-6zbMath1261.91019OpenAlexW2167624657MaRDI QIDQ1762420

Onur Kesten

Publication date: 26 November 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/On_Two_Kinds_of_Manipulation_for_School_Choice_Problems/6707180

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityschool choiceBoston mechanismtop trading cyclesstudent-optimal stable mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (19)

Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?] ⋮ An alternative characterization of top trading cycles ⋮ Application fee manipulations in matching markets ⋮ Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study ⋮ Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Two simple variations of top trading cycles ⋮ Sticky matching in school choice ⋮ Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• Constrained school choice
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• On randomized matching mechanisms
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Procedurally fair and stable matching
• Robust stability in matching markets
• School Choice with Consent^*
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems