Herding with collective preferences

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0609-7zbMath1261.91010OpenAlexW1970402104MaRDI QIDQ1762422

Xianqiang Yang

Publication date: 26 November 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0609-7

zbMATH Keywords

social learningmomentumherd behaviorobservational learningsequential votingpayoff interdependence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (12)

SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS ⋮ An experiment on behavior in social learning games with collective preferences ⋮ The probability of pluralistic ignorance ⋮ Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner ⋮ Social learning with coordination motives ⋮ Altruistic observational learning ⋮ Congested observational learning ⋮ Interacting information cascades: on the movement of conventions between groups ⋮ Payoff externalities and social learning ⋮ Observational learning in large anonymous games ⋮ Conformity and influence ⋮ Super tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

Cites Work

• Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids
• Social learning with private and common values
• Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
• Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Sequential Equilibria
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting

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