Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle

DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0413-0zbMath1112.91341OpenAlexW2131898199MaRDI QIDQ1762738

Pietro Reichlin, Paolo Siconolfi

Publication date: 11 February 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0413-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

Revisiting the model of credit cycles with good and bad projects ⋮ Lending terms and aggregate productivity ⋮ Volatile capital flows and financial integration: the role of moral hazard ⋮ A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection ⋮ Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors

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