The strong sequential core in a dynamic exchange economy

DOI10.1007/s00199-003-0404-1zbMath1093.91043OpenAlexW2112098113MaRDI QIDQ1762741

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 11 February 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/f1d682dc-b6b5-4b02-a42a-1aa92c154417

zbMATH Keywords

UncertaintyCoreStationary economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

Coalitions with limited coordination ⋮ On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games ⋮ Dynamic linear programming games with risk-averse players ⋮ Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: a dynamic coalitional stability perspective

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