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Publication:1762844
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0291-1zbMath1083.91052OpenAlexW4231741191MaRDI QIDQ1762844
Publication date: 11 February 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0291-1
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Group preferences (91B10) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (12)
Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship ⋮ Bounded response of aggregated preferences ⋮ Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain ⋮ Impossibility theorems are modified and unified ⋮ Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness ⋮ Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives ⋮ On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness ⋮ Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation ⋮ A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory ⋮ Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems ⋮ Strategy-proofness and weighted voting ⋮ Social Choice Theory
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