A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
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Publication:1762856
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0245-7zbMath1090.91058OpenAlexW2115051526MaRDI QIDQ1762856
Publication date: 11 February 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143787
Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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