Stability and voting by committees with exit
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Publication:1762858
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6zbMath1090.91017OpenAlexW2172239408MaRDI QIDQ1762858
Gustavo Bergantiños, Dolors Berga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
Publication date: 11 February 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15137
Related Items (11)
Simple collective identity functions ⋮ Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences ⋮ Procedural group identification ⋮ An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit ⋮ Candidate stability and voting correspondences ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model ⋮ On exiting after voting ⋮ Unanimity and resource monotonicity ⋮ Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains
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