Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
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Publication:1762925
DOI10.1007/s10058-003-0112-0zbMath1083.91061OpenAlexW2128271187MaRDI QIDQ1762925
Publication date: 11 February 2005
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0112-0
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