Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences

DOI10.1016/j.disc.2004.08.012zbMath1090.90159OpenAlexW1995859802WikidataQ59560599 ScholiaQ59560599MaRDI QIDQ1763331

Daniel Krasner, Steven Jaslar, Endre Boros, Vladimir A. Gurvich

Publication date: 22 February 2005

Published in: Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disc.2004.08.012

zbMATH Keywords

Gale-Shapley theoremStable matchingStable marriageCyclic preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70)

Related Items (20)

\(d\)-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Counterexamples of small size for three-sided stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Minimal instances with no weakly stable matching for three-sided problem with cyclic incomplete preferences ⋮ Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences ⋮ A counterexample of size 20 for the problem of finding a 3-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences ⋮ Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective ⋮ Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners ⋮ Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Geometric stable roommates ⋮ Hardness results for stable exchange problems ⋮ On the existence of three-dimensional stable matchings with cyclic preferences ⋮ Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences ⋮ Matching with ownership ⋮ A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation

Cites Work

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• Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
• Perfect graphs are kernel solvable
• Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems.
• The list chromatic index of a bipartite multigraph
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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