A power analysis of linear games with consensus

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.03.004zbMath1087.91005OpenAlexW2077197069MaRDI QIDQ1763889

Francesc Carreras, Josep Freixas

Publication date: 22 February 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Shubik power indexSimple gameLinear gameVoting by count and accountWeighted majority game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

A minimum dimensional class of simple games ⋮ On \(\alpha\)-roughly weighted games ⋮ Sequential legislative lobbying ⋮ The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules. ⋮ Egalitarian property for power indices ⋮ A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES

Cites Work

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• A class of simple games
• Generalized Gini inequality indices
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Complete simple games
• Complete games with minimum
• Automorphisms and weighted values
• Different ways to represent weighted majority games
• The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules.
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game

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